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Title Modelling the Outcomes of International Crises Using Confrontation Analysis 7 
Abstract 8 
Aim To explore the professional application of Professor Nigel Howard’s 1998 Confrontation 9 
Analysis method of modelling political conflicts.  10 
Case Study The Confrontation Analysis methodology was applied to the design of a political-11 
military (pol-mil) game held at the UK’s Defence Academy in 2011 to examine the future course 12 
of the then current Libyan Civil War. 13 
Methodology Confrontation Analysis provides a structured schema to help identify the parties 14 
involved in a dispute, highlight the differences in their narratives, find the subsequent dilemmas 15 
and attempt to resolve them to move the situation on. This helps provide rigour to analysis, 16 
negotiation and decision making as it clearly documents initial policy positions and subsequent 17 
changes through the use of cards which summarise each stakeholder’s position at each stage.   18 
Value The methodology, used in conjunction with role-play and multi-player teams, was found 19 
to have some utility, not in forecasting detailed outcomes, but in highlighting key aspects of the 20 
potential development of the situation. This research concluded that Confrontation Analysis can 21 
make a significant contribution to understanding and analyzing international crises as well as 22 
assisting in formulating successful national policy. Confrontation Analysis can be also be an 23 
invaluable part of a learning process for analysts and key decision makers facing real crises.  24 
Keywords Confrontation Analysis; dilemma analysis; drama theory; international crises; 25 
forecasting; gaming; game theory; role-play; serious games; serious gaming; simulation; 26 
wargaming; wargames. 27 
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Introduction: Free Kriegsspiel and Committee Wargames 30 
Since the Prussian Kriegsspiel games of the 19th century, wargaming has been an important part 31 
of military training (Allen, 1989; Perla, 2011; Sabin, 2012; Smith, 2010).  Training wargames 32 
have usually emphasised operational movement and combat aspects of warfare, rather than 33 
political aspects of confrontations (Smith, 2010). At the start of the Cold War in 1945 there were 34 
a variety of manual wargames focusing on testing command and control facilities, training or 35 
developing better war-fighting strategies. Many of the American games such as 36 
THEATERSPIEL looked at war between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in central Europe (Allan, 37 
1989; Perla, 2011). These games subsequently included various mathematically based computer 38 
models of an all-out thermo-nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and United States. 39 
In the 1950s, the US government recognised the limitations of existing wargaming techniques 40 
and started to develop new wargaming methodologies. These started with strategic games 41 
focussing on modelling high level crises rather than the actual hostilities (Bennett, 1988; Wilson, 42 
1968). The American government’s methods are worth examining in detail because in many 43 
ways the methodology of crises games has not evolved much since these early games. When 44 
events indicated that a situation had potential to develop into a confrontation, a team of seven to 45 
eight military officers carried out an investigation by interviewing staff operations and 46 
intelligence officers, and other specialists inside and outside of government, especially in 47 
universities (Hansen, 2013; Wilson, 1968). The relevant United States ambassador, with current 48 
political knowledge of some of the states involved, would be included in these interviews. The 49 
team aimed to generate a fact book covering the combat potential of the forces involved, relevant 50 
geography and other resources. This work was supported by a written paper on Problems, Issues 51 
and Questions that included different views of the situation; based on these sources, the scenario 52 
was generated and the game prepared.  53 
Such crisis games normally included as players a committee of five to ten participants 54 
representing each country (Hansen, 2013). These committees collectively made decisions in the 55 
best interests of the country they are playing, but with no representation of in-fighting within 56 
teams (as could happen by making different members of the team take on specific roles, such as 57 
service chiefs, and giving each of them individual as well as team objectives). The teams 58 
representing the United States  were expected to pursue whatever policies best helped the United 59 
States achieve her national interest, but other teams were expected to act in a way that reflected 60 
the American interpretation of the national interest or ideologies of the countries they were 61 
playing (Howard, 1998; Wilson 1968). 62 
Over the course of the three real days allocated to each game, the committees spent four hours 63 
each day discussing the options, then outlined to the game moderator their plan for the next two 64 
to seven days in game-time (Hansen, 2013; Wilson, 1968). The outcomes of the different plans 65 
were then arbitrated by the Game Director using their experience along with advice from 66 
specialists, in a manner reminiscent of the free kriegsspiels of 19th Century Germany (Allen, 67 
1989; Smith, 2010). (In free kriesspiels combat outcomes are based on the recent combat 68 
experience of the senior game moderators (Curry, 2008). Therefore, the realism of the game 69 
outcomes was critically dependent on the skill and knowledge of the game moderators.) The 70 
post-game debrief was collated into a thirty minute short film enlivened with archive shots of 71 
riots, ships and troop movements consistent with the game’s storyline. 72 
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The American government recognised the value of these games for training; Griffin (1965) 73 
reported that the games gave specialists a view outside their own field and participants learnt 74 
about the pressures real world foreign policy operates in. The military reported that the games 75 
gave them insights into problems that might otherwise have been overlooked. Thomas Schelling, 76 
a Nobel Prize-winning academic who directed a number of games in the 1960’s pioneered the 77 
concept of bargaining in strategic behaviour (Schelling 1960 and 1966). Schelling said, “One 78 
thing games could teach… was how little strategy, or even war was military; how it was less 79 
concerned with the application of force than with the exploitation of potential forces. They could 80 
teach the importance of communicating with one’s opponents, not only by what one said, but by 81 
what one did.” Wilson (1968, p71). 82 
Since these early games, seminar wargames (or committee games as they are referred to in the 83 
UK) have become an integral part of American planning and training regimes, even into the 84 
Internet age (Smith, 2010; Perla, 2011). The underlying game methodology of the American 85 
Department of Homeland Security’s biennial cyber warfare exercise CYBER STORM is based 86 
on those same principles. As many of these games integrate political manoeuvres alongside 87 
military actions they are commonly referred to as pol-mil games. Although modern pol-mil 88 
wargaming frequently is supported by computers and the resources of the Internet, it is still 89 
essentially driven by committees making decisions, with outcomes arbitrated by game 90 
moderators (Hansen, 2013); they can be viewed as free kriegsspiels with added multimedia. 91 
Development of Confrontation Analysis  92 
Howard, (1971) criticised the use of the existing seminar/committee game wargame 93 
methodology for assessing national security matters because it gave too much scope to 94 
unorthodox behaviour; too often participants became bored and did things out of curiosity to see 95 
what would happen. He argued that such committee games tended to produce non-replicable 96 
results in which the actual process by which decisions were made was difficult to record, and the 97 
group dynamics within each committee were impossible to model. Howard reasoned that a 98 
structure was needed to help produce more plausible player behaviour, and proposed the 99 
technique of metagame analysis (Fraser and Hipel, 1980).  Metagame analysis involved making 100 
a game out of a problem, where the players attempt to achieve their objectives based on the 101 
options open to them. Subsequent analysis of a metagame may give insight into potential 102 
strategies when faced by such problems. In the 1990s, Howard developed metagame analysis 103 
into a new technique that he called Confrontation Analysis (also known as Drama Theory and 104 
Dilemma Analysis). 105 
Confrontation Analysis is a method that can be used to structure, think through and understand 106 
complex multi-party interactions (Howard, 1998). Howard intended the method as a challenge to 107 
game theory. Game theory is a method of mathematically modelling conflict between rational 108 
decision makers in which gains and losses are defined numerically and determined by the 109 
interaction of strategies chosen by each player, expressed in a decision/payoff matrix (Neumann 110 
and Morgenstern, 1944). Confrontation Analysis assumed that rather than behaving in ways 111 
consistent with the tenets of classical game theory, the actors involved in such complex 112 
interactions actually attempted to re-define the rules of the game when interacting during a crisis. 113 
In practise this means the players generate new options for actions they can take during the 114 
game, with each option potentially changing the situation, often making it more complex. 115 
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Whilst classical game theory treats an entire interaction on the basis of a single decision matrix 116 
and attempts to resolve it, usually by choosing the decision that minimizes the opponent’s 117 
maximum gain, Confrontation Analysis treats interactions as a sequence of changes to the 118 
decision matrix as negotiations progress. 119 
During a game based on the principles of Confrontation Analysis, the parties involved discuss 120 
the situation until they have made their initial positions clear; these positions could be visualised 121 
as a card table (also referred to as an options board). The term card table was coined because the 122 
participants had each option summarised in front of them on a card, which they could bring into 123 
play on the table. The use of such option cards to mediate interactions produced precisely-124 
defined dilemmas in terms of contradictory options. These well-defined dilemmas then become 125 
the subject of negotiations as each party attempts to eliminate their own dilemmas (Azar, 126 
Khosravani, & Jalali, 2014; Howard, 1998).  127 
Summary of Confrontation Analysis Gaming Process 128 
Research game topic 129 
↓ 130 
Design cards 131 
↓ 132 
Layout initial cards 133 
↓ 134 
Cards changed to eliminate dilemmas 135 
↓ 136 
When no dilemmas are remaining or no further changes are made to cards, the game is 137 
resolved 138 
Worked Example of Confrontation Analysis from the Bosnian Confrontation (1995) 139 
This example is taken from the work of British General Rupert Smith, drawing on his experience 140 
during NATO interventions in Bosnia and Kosovo (1995 and 1999). The concept also formed 141 
some of the theoretical background behind his 2006 book The Utility of Force. General Rupert 142 
Smith placed great credence on the method, but due his retirement and the death of Nigel Howard, 143 
the method lost traction in the military and there was no evidence of its continued use in actual 144 
military procedures as proposed by Smith (2001). However, outside the military, the method has 145 
occasionally been used for defence, political, legal, financial and commercial applications (Smith, 146 
2006, Young, 2011). This example is a theoretical representation of the interaction between the 147 
Bosnian Serbs and the United Nations over some of the safe areas in the former Yugoslavia. 148 
Historically, the Bosnian Serbs had surrounded UN enclaves with forces poised to attack. Each 149 
side had a position about what they wanted to happen; this is summarized in diagram 1. NATO, 150 
on behalf of the United Nations, opted to use artillery and airstrikes to change the Bosnian Serb 151 
position. General Smith argued that if the tool of Confrontation Analysis had been used, NATO 152 
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could have achieved the same outcomes, without the actual use of the artillery and airstrikes. 153 
Clearly, this would have been a better solution.   154 
Diagram 1: Initial Card Table of Bosnia Example 155 
 156 
 157 
Looking at the column titled Bosnian Serbs’ Position we see that they wanted: 158 
 To be able to attack the enclaves (shown by a tick in the box on row 1). 159 
 NOT to withdraw heavy weapons from next to the enclaves (cross on row 2). 160 
 For the UN NOT to use air strikes (cross in row 4). 161 
 Note that the Serbs were ambivalent about taking hostages (row 3), they were willing to 162 
do so if they needed to, particularly if the UN employed air strikes.. 163 
The UN wanted: 164 
 The Bosnian Serbs NOT to attack the enclaves. 165 
 The Bosnian Serbs to withdraw their heavy weapons away from the enclaves. 166 
 The Bosnian Serbs NOT to take hostages. 167 
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If no further changes were made in the situation then what the sides were saying would happen is 168 
shown in the Threatened Future Column: 169 
 The Bosnian Serbs said they would attack the enclaves. 170 
 The Bosnian Serbs said they would NOT withdraw their heavy weapons. 171 
 The Bosnian Serbs said they would take hostages if the UN uses air strikes. 172 
 The UN said it would initiate air strikes.  173 
The initial confrontation analysis identified four problems, known as dilemmas in Confrontation 174 
Analysis, as shown on the card table. A dilemma can be identified on any row, where there one of 175 
the parties does not want a threatened future to happen. For example, row 1 shows the Bosina 176 
Serbs are threatening to attack the enclaves. The action, attack the enclaves, has a tick under the 177 
threatened future column. The UN does not want this to happen, as shown by a cross under their 178 
position in column 5. The next stage involved the parties attempting to change the card table to 179 
eliminate some or all of these dilemmas. This illustrated part of the power of the method, as it 180 
forced the stakeholders to think in term of clearly defined objectives.  181 
In the situation illustrated in diagram 1, the Bosnian Serbs had one dilemma (UN air strikes 182 
against them), but the UN had three. Three of those dilemmas revolved around the need to dissuade 183 
the Bosnian Serbs from taking three actions (attacking the enclaves, keeping the heavy weapons 184 
in the enclave, taking hostages).  185 
Faced with these dilemmas, the UN modified the card table to its advantage by taking two 186 
actions within its control. First, it withdrew its forces from the positions where they were 187 
vulnerable to being taken hostage. This eliminated the Bosnian Serbs’ option to take hostages (i.e. 188 
it deleted the third row from the table). The second action was to create a new card Use Artillery 189 
against Bosnian Serbs. The UN had a Rapid Reaction military force moving into a position where 190 
it could use artillery against the Bosnian Serbs. This modified the card table to that shown in 191 
diagram 2.  192 
Diagram 2: Second Card Table of Kosovo Example. 193 
The UN has eliminated the hostage card and introduced the credible Use Artillery card changing 194 
the situation in their favour. The Bosnian Serbs now have two dilemmas (the threat of airstrikes 195 
and use of artillery against them).  196 
 197 
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 198 
The Bosnian Serbs were faced with the situation in which they could still attack the enclaves and 199 
not withdraw their heavy weapons, but the UN could respond by using artillery and air strikes 200 
against them (which would interfere with their ability to attack/ keep their heavy weapons). Faced 201 
with this new situation, the Bosnian Serbs modified their position to that shown in the final card 202 
table, diagram three.  203 
  204 
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Diagram 3: Final Card Table of Kosovo example  205 
The card table shows that the Serbs would not attack and they would move their weapons away 206 
from the enclaves. In return, there would be no UN airstrikes or artillery used against them. This 207 
illustrates how Confrontation Analysis could have been used to identify and clearly resolve 208 
dilemmas the UN faced. Confrontation Analysis does not necessarily produce a win-win 209 
situation, but it is an analytic technique for identifying dilemmas and can help predict how the 210 
parties will attempt to change the decision table itself. 211 
 212 
 213 
214 
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The Future of Libya Game Using Confrontation Analysis 215 
In 2011 the Defence Academy of the UK wanted to examine the future course of the then current 216 
Libyan Civil War using a pol-mil wargame. Confrontation Analysis became the basis for the 217 
game-design structure because it imposed a particular framework on what might otherwise have 218 
been a standard free-play seminar/committee game. 219 
At the time of the game being run in July 2011, the rebellion against Colonel Gaddafi, the ruler 220 
of the North African state of Libya, had been ongoing for six months. The background to the 221 
civil war has been analysed (Bhardwaj, 2012; Chen, 2014; Huband, 2013; Joffre, 2011) and 222 
should be seen in the context of wider regional discontent in the Middle East. 223 
The military situation in Libya had become a stalemate and international military commentators 224 
were not predicting a military solution to the situation (Steel, 2011). Despite NATO bombing, 225 
the various rebel forces seemed unable to defeat the forces loyal to the regime and its leader 226 
Colonel Gaddafi. During the game, five major factions in the civil war were directly played by 227 
teams; Colonel Gaddafi and his immediate supporters, the international community (France, 228 
Italy, UK and the UAE were most committed militarily and politically), the National Transitional 229 
Council (NTC, the recognised opposition), the Tripoli Citizens (50% of the population) and the 230 
Berbers. Further details of the political situation, including the briefings and maps used during 231 
the game are available online (www.decisionworkshops.com, 2016). 232 
The real-world situation involved multiple stakeholders with a range of potential options and was 233 
therefore suitable for modelling using Confrontation Analysis. The game was run by Decision 234 
Workshops, a company specialising in analysing confrontations, and was hosted at the Defence 235 
Academy of the United Kingdom with the support of Cranfield University. The participants 236 
included those with military experience, businessmen, academics with experience in simulations 237 
of international crises and specialist input by those directly affected by the civil war in Libya.  238 
Summary of the Game Narrative 239 
The various teams were given a set of options, embodied in the cards, which they could then play 240 
to represent actions they might take during play. For example, Gaddafi could leave the country 241 
or withdraw from Tripoli; the NTC could agree to a ceasefire with the Gaddafi forces and the 242 
UN could launch bombing operations in support of the NTC and/ or the Berbers. The players 243 
were also empowered to create their own cards to represent actions not provided by the game 244 
designers; this was particularly useful as the game evolved from the starting positions. The 245 
technique helped moderate the free rein of individual player personalities by establishing at least 246 
a starting framework for their actions, which was more tightly controlled by the designers than is 247 
usually the case in free-play seminar games. 248 
The key element of the game was changing the table itself by adding or removing options. At 249 
each stage of the game, the player teams discussed potential options amongst themselves, 250 
sometimes after consultation with the game moderator or other subject matter experts who were 251 
available. The teams presented their ideas to add or remove options on the table, with the game 252 
moderator adjudicating discussion of the feasibility of their proposals. The outcomes of the 253 
contest for mutual leverage with these competing strategic initiatives being codified in the 254 
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options table. The outcome on each row was determined by the side with agency in each case, 255 
unless that side was ambivalent, in which case the other recessive preferences triumphed. 256 
Diagram 4: Illustration of the Card Table for options for the International Community 257 
The International Community had the option of bombing Tripoli and threatened to do it. The 258 
table shows that Gaddafi did not want this future to happen (shown by an X), but the 259 
International Community and the Tripoli Citizens’ did (shown by a tick). The NTC did not mind 260 
if Tripoli was bombed or not (shown by a dash). The Berbers’ position was blank as they had not 261 
yet expressed any preference about this potential future. The detail of the game has been 262 
published (Curry and Young, 2017). 263 
 264 
The course and outcome of the game was different from the way events developed in the real 265 
world. While there were many similarities, the key difference was that after extensive 266 
negotiations, the Gaddafi player offered to withdraw from Tripoli in exchange for a ceasefire.  267 
The proposal was beneficial to all parties, except apparently Gaddafi. The Gaddafi player had 268 
extensive experience of gaming this sort of pol-mil game and they concluded they were not 269 
going to win the current military confrontation, therefore they identified the next best possible 270 
strategy. This was to obtain a ceasefire which would allow them relocate their remaining forces 271 
to their geographical stronghold. In return for this withdrawal, The NTC would agree a ceasefire 272 
with Gaddafi’s forces; both sides consent was required before the ceasefire card could be played.  273 
The NTC were so focussed on the prize of occupying Tripoli, they agreed.  Gaddafi then used 274 
the ceasefire (and the suspension of air attacks) to move into the south of the country (the desert 275 
region near Chad) effectively going into internal exile, and his son Saif moved the remains of the 276 
army to Gaddafi's home town of Sirte. As the ceasefire became effective, it became apparent that 277 
although the majority of the population of Libya was now outside Gadhafi’s control, Gaddafi 278 
still maintained control of a large area of desert in the south (Fezzan and Sirte). The International 279 
community team were surprised that although part of Libya had been liberated, Gaddafi was able 280 
to establish a new position of some strength. 281 
With Gaddafi's forces no longer in Tripoli, the card Suppress Tripoli revolt that had been played 282 
by Gaddafi to prevent the Citizens of Tripoli from rising up, was removed from the card table.   283 
The Citizens of Tripoli then seized control of the city before the NTC forces arrived. The fact 284 
that Tripoli had freed itself, rather than being liberated by NTC or Berber forces, had significant 285 
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influence on the largely political struggles between the various parties to become dominant in the 286 
government of post-civil war Libya.    287 
Player Experience and the Game Outcome 288 
A point to note was that the person playing Gaddafi had actually played the same role during a 289 
rehearsal workshop a week before at the annual UK Conference of Wargamers (Wargame 290 
Developments, 2011), and so it is reasonable to assume they had learnt from that rehearsal. This 291 
practise prior to the second game had apparently improved the player’s subsequent performance. 292 
Rather than staying in Tripoli and struggling to maintain the current deadlock in the civil war, 293 
they offered sufficient incentives to some of the other players to allow Gaddafi to move to a new 294 
position that was far more sustainable in the long term. The game inadvertently identified the 295 
best solution for Gaddafi, rather than potential solutions for the international community to 296 
completely remove Gaddafi and his regime, as the game designer had anticipated.  297 
Multipolar Gaming 298 
The Bosnia game example presented earlier was a relatively simple bipolar situation with two 299 
sides being represented (there were other stakeholders in the situation, but these had very limited 300 
range of actions they could take). In contrast, the Libyan scenario was multipolar, with each side 301 
having their own aims. This is more reflective of many current political confrontations. Such 302 
situations can be visualised as a problem space, with an initial state connected by a game tree of 303 
decision points to a set of goal states. Confrontation Analysis can take this very complex 304 
situation and allows the players to generate new pathways through the issues which did not exist 305 
at the start of the game, ways that may not have been foreseen without using this method. By 306 
using the concept of the options table, the decision points that were the steps towards the final 307 
state of the game space are recorded.   308 
Role Play in Confrontation Analysis 309 
Role playing within the conflict is considered a necessity within the scope of Confrontation 310 
Analysis when run as a multi-player game for two main reasons; 1) the player has to take on the 311 
priorities of their party, and 2) the dilemma concept supports the personalization of the 312 
confrontation experience. Role playing within games has been demonstrated to support 313 
engagement (Chen et al, 2006), motivation (Dickey, 2007), social interaction (Cole & Griffiths, 314 
2007), and acquisition of content knowledge (Chan, 2012).  315 
However, role playing within Confrontation Analysis also creates potential. The participants of 316 
such a game are expected to come to the scenario with a certain amount of experience or 317 
knowledge about the dilemma; play does not teach the participant how to best support their role. 318 
This is different from the various role playing games where the participant creates their own 319 
character based on personal attributes (Hou, 2012). Within each dilemma are variables that 320 
create expectations for role playing; for example the team representing NATO needs to be aware 321 
of the NATO’s policy on using force in a civil war in a Confrontation Analysis scenario about 322 
the Libyan Civil War. Personal attributes are not a consideration for the role playing within 323 
Confrontation Analysis as they are in many of the popular role playing games that exist online 324 
and within gaming communities.  325 
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Controlling the Game Narrative 326 
Game moderators face a tension between keeping a game on the narrative track envisioned by the 327 
game designer or letting the game’s narrative emerge organically from player decisions. One of 328 
the challenges of using Confrontation Analysis in gaming is moderating player inventiveness. 329 
Allowing participants to discover unconventional strategies (so called black swans) can be 330 
useful, but so can constraining the participants to explore some of the most likely options for 331 
each role.  332 
If the game space is visualised as an ever expanding branching tree network, occasional low 333 
probability choices can move the game state into an entirely different branch. When gameplay 334 
begins within a set construct, a series of tasks are assigned to each team and they embody their 335 
roles within the session. At this point the game moderator retains control over the emerging 336 
storyline, introducing new tracks and situations as they arise. Conflict begins to occur when the 337 
narrative becomes a question of experience and opportunity. Players of Confrontation Analysis 338 
games, drawn from the public sector, are likely to be by nature experienced in war, politics, and 339 
government. However, well-constructed options cards can help players engage with the game 340 
and keep track of the evolving situation.  341 
The Box Analogy.  342 
The game design creates the sandbox and hopefully makes its dimensions large enough to 343 
contain where the players want to go. However, players being players, almost always push on the 344 
boundaries of the box. Clever design can sometimes make those boundaries flexible enough to 345 
stretch so the players can be directed naturally onto the central focus of the game without feeling 346 
like the moderator has artificially constrained their choices of action. Those jumps are frequently 347 
the source of important insights. The moderator then needs to find a way to expand the box to re-348 
contain the players, or alternatively find a way to pull them back in, which can be a real problem 349 
if they have tried to make a major change to the game narrative. An example of this, in the 350 
Libyan case study was the Berbers (a minority group opposed to Gaddafi), presenting an options 351 
card “Offer Russia a port in Libya and oil concession, in return for immediate military 352 
intervention”. Without exploring the details in this article, it is easy to see that this would 353 
completely change the dynamics of a game focused on the internal aspects of the civil war, into a 354 
multi-national game involving Russia on one side and NATO on the other. The game moderator 355 
constrained the players by applauding the idea, but saying the resolution would be a long term 356 
issue, far beyond the game time scale of the current game.   357 
Conclusions 358 
Strategic games, dealing with political conflict short of all-out war, are a significant part of 359 
national policy making. This research examined the use of Confrontation Analysis as a 360 
methodology for designing games about pol-pil confrontations.  361 
The evidence from the Libyan game was the use of the card table was an effective briefing tool 362 
that proved useful in allowing non-subject specialists to rapidly grasp what they could do in the 363 
game. 364 
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A central feature of Confrontation Analysis is the assumption of good communication between 365 
the teams, allowing the positions of the parties on each option to be identified. The theory 366 
assumes that confrontations and dilemma resolution stages are proceeded by a scene setting stage 367 
where each party makes its position clear to the world.  In the past this could have been criticised 368 
as simplistic, as a party could tell different stories to each of the other parties, but in the modern, 369 
connected world this is a much harder position to sustain. A major advantage of Confrontation 370 
Analysis is that it works from open source information, namely the actual things parties are 371 
saying they could do (the options), who can do it (the participants), what the participants are 372 
saying they want to happen (the ticks and crosses). Accurate quantifications of the much 373 
analysed values of Game theory, are much harder to obtain, and may be in fact be more 374 
subjective than analysts would like to admit. 375 
The next step in this research is modelling other current world confrontations, such as the 376 
situation in Syria, that are fraught with so many similar issues. Confrontation Analysis shows 377 
promise as a structured approach to search out and identify potentially critical decision points 378 
and options. Using existing information, experts could apply their judgment of the utility of 379 
various courses of action and to map solutions that might offer a workable set of benefits to the 380 
key parties involved so as to identify potentially workable compromises. The promise of finding 381 
practical solutions to complex conflicts gives impetus to further investigation. 382 
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